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Abstract 
This paper presents a model of fertility, which is specific for the industrialization that 
took place during the nineteenth century and which was concurrent with the 
demographic transition that occurred over the period. While previous research on 
demographic transition assumed altruism as the main element explaining the increase 
in fertility rates, this paper does not, since altruism seems irrelevant over this period. 
The relationship between parents and children is part of a whole set of values and 
social norms that evolved over time and were affected by changes in the economic 
environment. In the nineteenth century, parental behavior was not compatible with 
altruism. I therefore present a model that suits the social norms of the nineteenth 
century. The value that seems to correspond to the legal system and social norms 
regarding the parent-child relationship of the period o f industrialization is 
perpetuation. Due to a budget constraint on workers, perpetuation is displayed 
differently in different social classes. This paper will therefore focus on the interaction 
between the different social classes and show how industrialization is linked to 
demographic transition. 
JEL classification: J13; O11; O16; O40. 




* Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel Fax: 972 (3) 535-3180; 
   brezie@mail.biu.ac.il.  
     I wish to thank Mike Bordo, Daniel Cohen, Francois Crouzet, Steven Durlauf, James 
Foreman-Peck, Oded Galor, Edward Glaeser, Knick Harley, Samuel Hollander, Peter Temin, 
Thierry Verdier, Eugene White, and Warren Young, conference participants at the European 
Economic Historical Society Conference, and the European Economic Association meetings, 
as well as participants at seminars at Delta, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rutgers 
University and the University of Wisconsin for their helpful comments. 2 
 
I. Introduction 
In recent models on demographic transition, altruism and human capital play a 
preponderant role in decisions about fertility (see Becker et al. (1990), Galor and Weil 
(1996, 2000), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), and Galor and Moav (2002)). These models 
assume that children are a consumption good, i.e.  ceteris paribus, the higher the 
income level, the higher the fertility rate, which is derived from a particular way of 
assuming altruism. Indeed, altruism in these models means that an individual cares 
about the welfare of each of his children, and by assuming equality between children, 
these models generate the result that the number of children positively affects utility. 
In consequence, these models assert that the increase in income that occurred in the 
first half of the nineteenth century led to an increase in fertility.  
  This way of representing the utility function of parents seems perfectly 
representative for the way parents behave today. Altruism towards each child is 
obvious in the present, and it is almost a postulate that parents love and care for their 
children. Therefore, the way Becker and later, Galor et al. (Galor and Weil, 2000; 
Galor and Moav, 2002) have modeled family economics seems adequate. 
  However, the postulate that it is a natural and biological tendency to want to care 
for children has been questioned (see Badinter, 1980 and Aries, 1973). There is 
increasing evidence that altruism is not a good representation of what occurred in the 
eighteenth-nineteenth centuries - the centuries during which fertility rates increased. 
The parent-children relationship is part of a whole set of values and social norms that 
evolve over time and are affected by changes in the economic environment. Parental 
love is not an intrinsic value, which is independent and invariant to economic 
changes. It has evolved over time, and especially in the eighteenth-nineteenth 
centuries, the period of industrialization.1 
   For our generation, even raising the idea that parental love is not a fundamental 
value might seem outrageous, and some would argue that already in the Bible it was 
said that Abraham loved his son Isaac (Genesis, XXII, ii). On the other hand wasn’t 
he ready to sacrifice his son for a greater value, that is, God’s will?  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Zelizer, 1985. 3 
  Focusing more specifically on Europe over the period of the sixteenth to 
nineteenth century, parental behavior as displayed towards their children is not 
compatible with altruism. Indeed, during this period, most Parisian women (except the 
very poor) sent their children for nursing far away from Paris, when they knew that 
the probability of seeing the child coming back would be small. Badinter (1980, p.57) 
has reported that in the 1780s, of the 21,000 children born in Paris per annum, 18,000 
were sent away to a wet-nurse, and more than two thirds did not return to Paris. 
Women knew the danger of sending their children for nursing, but still did it. There 
are descriptions of women who sent two or three of their children away for nursing, 
and although they never returned from nursing at a specific location, still sent their 
subsequent children to the very same place.2 
  The legal system of the time, which was an expression of social norms over the 
period, is clear regarding the way society was then treating children: Parents had 
rights over children, but children had no rights. In Greece and Rome, the father had all 
rights over life and death of his sons; he had the right to put them in prison (see 
Cicero, prodomo 3). In France of the thirteenth century, a father who killed his son 
was not in violation of the existing criminal law. The laws enacted by Henri II and 
Henri III (1556, 1579) proclaimed that children who married against parental will or 
permission, not only would be ineligible for an inheritance, but could be accused of 
abduction which was legally punishable by the death penalty (see Badinter, 1980, 
p.32). Moreover when parents were not satisfied with their children, the children 
could be sent away for deportation. (French law, 1763). 
  The element of altruism is adequate when modeling the family economics of the 
twentieth century, since nowadays, family behavior in the sixteenth to nineteenth 
centuries seems to us to be unacceptable, to say the least. However for describing this 
period, it is necessary to represent and take into account the social norms and values 
of the specific period. As this paper focuses on the nineteenth century, I will, 
therefore, present a model that is appropriate for the social norms of the eighteenth-
nineteenth centuries. The model will also permit a closer fit to the data of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, while there is no doubt that total income increased in the 
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first half of the nineteenth century, the income of the most important social class -- the 
workers -- did not increase, and for some even decreased. Thus, those models that 
assume altruism predict a decrease in fertility, and cannot, therefore, explain the 
increase in fertility that occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century.  
  The value that seems to correspond to both the legal system and social norms 
regarding the parental-child relationship of the period of industrialization is 
perpetuation. Parents wanted children in order to have a “continuation” of their line. 
If children were not an extension of the values of their father, they had no reason to 
be. This need for perpetuation is reflected in the legal system: for example, the laws 
that if children married against the will of parents, parents could imprison them, or if 
parents were not satisfied with their children, they could be sent for deportation. 
Indeed, it seems rational that if one cared about continuity, one cared about the 
marriage of children being related to specific individual values. The model I present 
in this paper is, therefore, based not on altruism but on perpetuation.  
However perpetuation does not display itself in the same way for all individuals. 
Continuity was different for workers and the business elite, due to a budget constraint 
for the workers. Workers did not save, and workers’ children had to work in order to 
increase the income of the family. As Marx claimed: “All family ties among the 
proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of 
commerce and instruments of labour” (Marx and Engels, 1955, p. 28). Or again, as 
expressed by Marx: “In order that the family may live, four people must now not only 
labour, but expend surplus labor for the capitalist…Previously, the workman sold his 
own labor power, which he disposed of nominally as a free agent. Now he sells wife 
and child. He has become a slave dealer” (Marx, 1967, p. 395).  
In bad times, this additional income was needed even more, which led to an 
increase in the number of children. Indeed Marx saw this inverse correlation between 
wages and fertility rates: “In fact…the absolute size of the families stands in inverse 
proportion to the height of wages” (Marx, 1976, p. 796-7).3 For the business elite, 
child labor was irrelevant, but perpetuation introduces itself in the form of a need to 
perpetuate the family business.  
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Therefore, during the period of increase in fertility, which corresponds to the first 
phase of industrialization, the model presented in this paper takes an opposite view to 
the model presented by Galor et  al. However, during the second phase of 
industrialization, our models are complementary. In their models, by introducing 
education and human capital, they generate a substitution effect between quantity of 
children and quality. In consequence, fertility rates decrease. In the model presented 
in this paper, capital-labor ratio increases during the second phase, and therefore 
wages go up, which reduce the constraint on child labor. Parents can move towards 
their optimum level of fertility and reduce the number of children.  
  Briefly put, the two types of models focus on different aspects of the reduction of 
fertility. This paper, which focuses on the nineteenth century (the time of the 
demographic transition) concentrates on capital, and does not deal with human capital, 
because the central factor of industrialization has been attributed to capital and its 
accumulation through savings.4 
  This paper therefore, focuses on capital accumulation, and analyzes the 
interaction between the different social classes and  their effects on fertility rates. 
Indeed, the difference in income between the social classes affects their budget 
constraint, and therefore their economic decisions. Our proposed model will clarify 
the relationship between fertility rates across different classes, since it analyzes the 
behavior of both the proletariat and the elite. We will show that, in fact, their 
economic decisions on fertility are different, and we will relate this result to the 
literature on fertility of the different social classes. 
  The literature on the difference in fertility rates in the different social classes is 
mainly comprised of Stevenson (1920), Notestein (1936), Innes (1938), Johnson 
(1960), Haines (1989), and Woods (1987). There is a debate regarding whether the 
social class differentials of fertility were larger during the early stages of fertility 
decline. Stevenson and Innes claim that they were after 1860, and that there was some 
diffusion of this phenomenon. Woods argues against the widening differentials and 
against the diffusionist view of the English fertility decline. The data seems to favor a 
widening of differentials, but is less clear about diffusionism (see Haines, 1989). 
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inflows of capital from abroad (see Brezis, 1995 and Neal, 1990). 6 
  This paper enables the analysis of the relationship between the fertility rates of 
the workers and the business elite. The model developed below establishes that during 
the increase in fertility, there is a relationship between these two rates, while during 
the demographic transition, these two rates are not related, and therefore one cannot 
speak of diffusionism, as shown in the data. The model’s dynamics exhibit an initial 
increase in the fertility rates at the onset of the Industrial Revolution in both the 
proletariat and the business elite. However, during the phase of the decrease in 
fertility of the workers, i.e., the demographic transition, there is no relationship 
between these two rates. The decrease in fertility of the business elite occurred 
independently of the dynamics of the fertility of the workers.   
  This paper is divided into five parts. Section II presents some historical facts 
related to the model. Section III presents the model, Section IV, the equilibrium and 
dynamics, and Section V is the conclusion. 
 
II. Historical context of the model 
2.1. Children’s work  
Children’s work in the nineteenth century was an important element in some of the 
industries.5 Children under 12 years old constituted 8% of the labor force in the cotton 
industry, and children aged 13-18 another 10% (see Evans, 1990, p. 250). Moreover, 
in certain counties in England in 1851, there was a positive correlation between 
fertility and the percentages of children aged 9-14 who were employed (see Birdsall, 
1983, p.116). 
  In the nineteenth century, the costs of raising worker’s children were very low. 
For example, in France, up to the age of 5, children were left with a nurse, for which 
the cost per annum was around 84 livres (see Badinter, 1980, p.65). When considering 
benefits, the wages received by children who started working at age 6 (and later on, 
due to legislation, at age 9), were around 450fs a year (around half that of adults) from 
which they kept for themselves around 20fs. So after one year of working they had 
repaid expenses, and in the other years there were net income inflows to the parents. 
In England, in a cotton mill survey undertaken in 1859, men were paid a weekly wage 
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of 18s and boys were paid 7s (see Evans, 1990). So for workers, the intergenerational 
income flows during the nineteenth century were from children to parents. 
  However, there was a rise in the costs of raising children in the late nineteenth 
century, due to the enforcement of restrictions on child labor. During the same period, 
it also became more expensive to raise children due to the Poor Law of 1868 that 
made it an offense for parents to fail to supply their children with such necessities as 
food, lodging, and clothing. Moreover, in 1891, schooling was made compulsory, so 
that at the turn of the century, the intergenerational flows are changing directions. 
 2.2 Fertility and Social classes 
 After the proto-industrial period, there was a widening of the differences between the 
classes that were almost non-existent before the eighteenth century. During the 
Industrial Revolution, society was comprised of many classes: workers, the 
bourgeoisie (e.g., liberal professions such as lawyers and doctors), the “haute 
bourgeoisie” (i.e., the business elite), the aristocracy (who had no economic impact on 
industrialization), and the farmers. While workers’ fertility increased, the business 
elite’s increased even more, while the aristocracy experienced a decrease in fertility 
by as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century.  
  The differences between social classes are not only reflected in the fertility rate, 
but also in the nuptiality rate. In the nineteenth century, workers married early, while 
the bourgeois continued to marry late: “Ages at first marriage for men were the lowest 
in marriages which involved male factory workers marrying female factory workers” 
(Lynch, 1991, p. 89). We will presently examine the main elements related to fertility 
in the business elite and in the proletariat.  
The business elite  
In the nineteenth century, “it has to be remarked that the beginning of industrialization 
was related with an increase in fertility especially in the milieu bourgeois” (Bardet 
and Dupaquier, 1998, p.112).6 Upon examination of the fertility rate among the 
business elite in England and in France, we find that it was higher than that of the 
other classes. The data show that the industrial elite of Manchester, Mulhouse in the 
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north of France, and Lorraine or the Ruhr area had a high fertility rate (see Daumard, 
1987; Evans and Lee, 1981; and Davidoff and Hall, 1987). Some prominent 
industrialists had many children, such as Sir John Guest  (10 children), William 
Crawshay (14), and Henry Overton Wills (18). In Alsace, the Koechlins had 14 
children, and the average for families in northern France who were engaged in textiles 
was more than 10. As Crouzet (1999, p. 47) points out: “Large families were not only 
a guarantee against early deaths, they allowed the appointment of the most able sons.” 
   The explanation for this behavior is that the business elite was interested in the 
continuation of the firm, or the familial enterprise, and this influenced the values of 
the time. The Victorian philosophy was to encourage women to stay home and have 
more children, or what was called “the Victorian role of women”.   
Wages and the proletariat 
 Since the salary of one person was not adequate for subsistence, having children 
brought about an increase in the family income. Table 1 presents data showing that 
the earnings of a worker couple were indeed not enough to survive.7    
  There is a long debate in the literature regarding the evolution of wages and more 
generally, the standard of living in the first half of nineteenth century England. While 
the optimists (Clapham, Ashton, Hartwell, and Lindert and Williamson) show that 
industrialization was equivalent to an increase in the standard of living of the workers, 
the pessimists (starting with Engels, Thompson, Toynbee, Hammond, and later 
Hobsbawm) disagree with this view.8 As underlined in Taylor (1975) and Feinstein 
(1998), this economic debate was tainted with philosophical biases and was related to 
the debate on the bienfaits of capitalism. In Table 2, we display the latest data by 
Feinstein but also series by Bowley and Wood (presented in Mitchell and Deane, 
1971) about the cotton industry which is one of the sectors employing the proletariat. 
Feinstein’s data display a long plateau and subsequent slow improvement, while the 
other series displayed in Table 2 shows that: “If the Chartists in 1837 had called for a 
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comparison of their time with 1787, and had obtained a fair account of the actual 
social life of the working-man at the two periods, it is almost certain that they would 
have recorded a positive decline in the standard of life of large classes of the 
population” (Hobsbawm, 1957, p.61).9 
  The model presented in the next section examines the relationship between 
capital, wages and fertility rates. It implies a negative relationship between wages and 
fertility rates, and therefore is in accordance with the pessimistic view on the first half 
of the century, which claim a slight reduction in real wages. About the second half of 
the century, there is no debate that real wages and living standards went up which, 
according to the model, leads to a decrease in fertility rates. 
   The facts related to the nobility and the petit bourgeoisie are interesting but not 
directly linked to our model, I, therefore, present them succinctly:  
The nobility and the aristocracy 
In France, there is strong evidence of a decrease in the fertility rate of the nobility as 
early as 1650-99 (see Peller, 1965; and Hollingsworth, 1965). By the late seventeenth 
century, the aristocracy adopted fertility control methods, and the “European marriage 
pattern” became less effective. Similarly, the haute bourgeoisie of Geneva as early as 
the seventeenth century experienced a reduction in fertility (Henry, 1956). They began 
with a high fertility rate, and later it decreased in order not to experience a decline in 
social status.  
  In England, the decrease in fertility began at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. There, the aristocracy moved from natural fertility to limited fertility much 
earlier than did other social groups. Some claim that they started out with a high 
fertility rate; for instance George III had 15 children and the Duke of Clarence had 10. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 Taking the confidence interval of Feinstein, and the evidence brought by him on biological 
variables (height and mortality), the pessimist view for the first half of the century is based on 
sound ground.   Moreover, on the consumption side, the decrease in income has been shown 
by the decrease in the consumption of meat, sugar, and tea in the first half of the century (see 
Taylor, 1975, p. xxxi). 10 
The petit bourgeoisie 
Among the petit bourgeoisie (i.e., the liberal professions), the fertility rate, on 
average, was lower than for the business elite. In this social class, children did not 
work. However, during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries, for 
the  urban petit bourgeoisie, it was necessary for the woman to work, and the 
Victorian, haute bourgeoisie ideology of family had no impact. The women were 
working, so the burden of the care of small children was problematic, a fact that 
favored limitations on fertility. When the level of income increased, women ceased to 
work and adopted the bourgeois philosophy.  
 
III. The model 
This paper focuses only on the two classes that played a preponderant role during the 
Industrial Revolution: the workers and the business elite. Their utility function is the 
same but workers are constrained, and do not save; the business elite saves and does 
not need to make their children work. The model restricts itself to the period where 
real wages did not exceed consumption. Moreover, since the size of the elite 
population is negligible, the size of the population is equal to the size of the worker 
population.  
  In this model, real wages are the key element in the demographic transition; but 
they are not exogenous. They are endogenously determined by the capital-labor ratio, 
which is itself a function of the quantity of labor (determined by the workers) and the 
quantity of capital (determined by the business elite).10 It is therefore the interaction 
between these two classes that leads to the dynamics of growth and fertility rates. In 
this section we present the model and the optimal decision of each class. 
3.1 Output and Utility function 
This paper relates to the factory system in the nineteenth century. Our focus will 
therefore be on the industrial sector, and not on agriculture. The two main factors of 
production are capital and labor (and we do not relate to land, since it is not an 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 In this model, we assume for matters of simplicity that the economy is a closed one, i.e., 
that there are no immigration or capital inflows.   11 
important factor of production for the industrial sector). The output function takes the 
form: 
a - a =
1
t t t L AK Y .  (1) 
  Since we assume a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas function, we get wages 
as an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio (where the second derivative is 
negative): 
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  About the utility function, it is different than in the models of Becker and Galor. 
As explained in the introduction, in this model I do not introduce the notion of 
altruism. The utility function of an individual instead of being a function of h is 
consumption and the consumption of his heirs, is a function of his consumption and 
his continuity (i.e., perpetuation), CO.  
) CO , C ( U U t t t = .  (3) 
  Perpetuation is mainly influenced by two factors. The first is the harm done to 
children which affects negatively perpetuation; the more the total hours of children 
work, the less the continuity. The second element is the value of the family firm: an 
increase in the value of the family firm leads to more continuity. So we get: 
) h n , S , C ( U ) CO , C ( U U t t t t t t = =   (4) 
where Ct, is consumption, St is the incremental value of the firm, h the numbers of 
hours children work and nt the number of children. Despite the same utility function, 
the business elite behavior is different than the workers due to a different budget 
constraint, we therefore analyze each of these classes separately.   
 3.2 The Business elite 
As explained above, the continuity for the business elite is related to the family 
business. The business elite was concerned about the family business and had an 
interest in the continuation of the familial enterprise. Moreover since children did not 
work, the utility function of the bourgeois is a function of consumption, Ct, and the 12 
incremental value of the firm, which is a function of the savings of the entrepreneur, 
St. Assuming an additive function with the same weight on each argument, we get: 
) S ( U ) C ( U ) S , C ( U U t t t t t + = = .  (5) 
  It is the uncertainty of survival of the firm that influenced the family’s decision 
regarding the number of children. Mortality remained high during the  nineteenth 
century, and the survival of the firm was a function of the number of children the 
business elite had; so that the higher the number of children in a family, the higher the 
probability of that family’s firm’s survival. We have shown in the previous section 
that fertility rate among the business elite was quite high. Indeed, familial firms 
belonging to families without many children usually did not survive: “Many dynasties 
have disappeared, because of a lack of offspring” (Crouzet, 1999, p.47). For instance, 
the André and the Schneider dynasties disappeared because of a small number of 
children (three) who died with no offspring.11    
  The value of the firm is not known with certainty, since it depends on whether the 
dynasty has offspring. Therefore the business elite maximizes an expected utility. 
When it has children who can take over the firm, the utility of the savings is U(St). 
But when there are no children, savings are lost and we obtain U(S)=0.  
Denoting p, as the probability of survival of the firm, we assume that: 
0 ' ' p and 0 ' p where ) n ( p p
b < > = ,  (6) 
where n
b is the number of children per family in the business elite.12 
Assuming a log function, we therefore obtain that expected utility is:  
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 (7) 
  We assume that each generation lives for  one period. The income of the 
entrepreneur is the rents that he receives on inherited capital, r tKt. He divides his 
income between his own consumption, the consumption of his children, and savings, St: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 See Crouzet (1999) and Lewis (1986). 
12 This probability is also a function of the mortality rate, but since it is exogenous in our 
framework, we ignore it.  13 
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C  includes his own consumption and that of his children.13 A share l of this 
total consumption  t
~
C  goes toward his own consumption (and a share 1-l goes to the 
children). We assume that the children’s’ consumption increases as a function of the 
number of children, i.e., the l(nt
b) function is negatively sloped, so that the higher the 
number of children, the lower the entrepreneur’s own consumption. We also assume 
that the function is convex. A simple form for this function is to choose an 
exponential form: 
n e
- = l .  
  Substituting in equation (7), we get that the entrepreneur chooses his savings and 
the number of his children so as to maximize: 




t t t t + l - .  (9) 
  Let us note that this utility function has some similarity to the one presented in 
models that assume altruism; we obtain an equivalent equation, but from different 
assumptions regarding the economy. 
  The first-order conditions are shown in equations (10) and (11), that determine 
the quantity of savings, consumption, and children chosen by the entrepreneur: 






t t ‡ + = = + =  P’’< 0.  (10) 






t = l l - . 
(11) 
  Equation (10) indicates that savings are a linear function of rents (rtKt). The right-
hand side of equation (11) is downward-sloping14, while the left-hand side is upward-
sloping (and in the case where the l function takes an exponential form, it is linear).15 
In consequence, there is a unique solution of the number of children, shown in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 The spouse’s consumption is included in his own consumption. 
14 The RHS might be upward-sloping for small n, then downward-sloping. If we assume that 
K is large enough or p is very concave, then the RHS always has a negative slope. 
15 For the SOC to be negative, we have to assume that l is such that  l l ‡ l ' ' '
2 . Under this 
condition, we obtain that the left-hand side is upward-sloping. 14 
Figure 1. An increase in the capital stock (Kt) implies that the upward-sloping curve 
moves to the right, which leads to an increase in the optimal number of children, we 
therefore get that the number of children is a positive function of the capital stock 
(Kt). 
3.3 The Workers 
Given the utility function presented in equation (4), workers did not have capital to 
bequest to their heirs. Moreover in the nineteenth century, for workers child labor was 
a necessity as shown in section 2; intergenerational income flows were from children 
to parents.16  
  Usually, children began working at the age of eight or nine, (and sometimes at age 
of six) and the incomes of all members of the family were pooled. After the age of 13, 
children were allowed to retain some of their income in order to build a small capital 
prior to marriage. The children’s’ income was a necessity in the proletariat: “At no 
stage in this family history, had they been able to manage only on the husband’s 
wage” (Meyering, 1990, p.141).  
So despite the fact that utility of the worker would be greater if his children did not 
work, he was constrained to let his children work. Since the salary of one person was 
not adequate for subsistence, (We analyze a period where wages were lower than the 
subsistence level, i.e.,  C  > w), having children brought about a n increase in the 
family income.17    
  So, in each period, workers choose to maximize a utility function:  
0 U , 0 U and ) h n , C ( U ) CO , C ( U U 2 1 t t t t t £ ‡ = =   (12) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 16 Hazan and Berdugo (2002) present a model where child labor is introduced in a Galor et 
al. type of framework, which assume that intergenerational flows are from parents to children. 
17 Dasgupta (1995) shows  that this need for child labor exists in developing countries 
nowadays. He also emphasizes that in developing countries, where children are in effect 
“working hands”, a reduction in productivity leads to an increase in fertility since more hands 
are needed. Moreover, based on data from the Population Institute’s value of children (VOC) 
project, Caldwell (1983, p.474) wrote that: “The findings indicate that fertility decline is 
associated with declining economic roles for children.” 15 
We also assume that U11£ 0, U22£ 0, U12 £ 0, and that h, the number of hours worked 
by children is constant and equal to 1, despite the fact that over the years, it has been 
legally reduced.   
  The budget constraint of the family in each period is: 
               
w w wn w ) n ( l C + = +    (13) 
C C and ‡ .   (14)  
C  is the subsistence level of consumption for an adult, n
w is the number of children 
that the worker has, and l(n
w) is the consumption of children. We assume that l(n
w) is 
upward-sloping and concave (l’>0 and l’’<0).  
  On the right hand side of equation (13), we have family income. This includes the 
worker’s wages as well as children’s wages. Children’s wages were, in reality, lower 
than wages of adults (about half in the textile industry), but in order to simplify the 
model, we take all wages as equal. On the left-hand side, we have the outlays, i.e., the 
worker’s consumption, as well as his children’s consumption. The inequality in 
equation (14) means that consumption cannot be lower than the subsistence level of 
consumption. 
  The top part of Figure 2 represents the utility function as a function of the number 
of children n, by substituting consumption from the budget constraint (13).18 
However, the wage rate is so low that at the maximum of the utility function, 
consumption is lower than the subsistence level. Therefore, equation (14) is binding, 
and the number of children is higher than the optimum and is such that: 
C *) n ( l * wn w
w w = - + ,  (15) 
as shown in the lower part of Figure 2. The optimum number of children is therefore 
higher than the non-binding maximum.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 It is easy to show that U(n) has an optimum where dU/dn=0, and that d
2U/dn
2<0. Indeed, 
since U(n) = U(w+wn-l(n), n), its derivative takes when n is small, a positive sign and a 
negative one when n tends to infinity. Moreover since d
2U/dn
2<0 then there exists an n such 
that the FOC is zero. 16 
Lemma 1. 
The optimal number of children of the proletariat is a negative function of wages. 
Proof. When wages increase (a shift to the left of the straight line in Figure 2), the 
constraint is reduced, and therefore the fertility rate decreases. The optimal number of 
children is therefore a negative function of wages as shown by differentiating 
equation (15): 
0 ) w ' l ( / ) n 1 ( dw / * dn
w < - + = .  (16) 
  An assumption that is necessary for this model is that l’£ w, that is, the net wages 
of children at the margin is greater than zero, i.e., the intergenerational transfer goes 
from children to parents, an assumption that holds for the proletariat during the 
nineteenth century, as we have shown above.  We also assume that the second 
derivative of the l function is such that  2     /(l'-w) ' n)l' (1 ‡ + . Under this assumption, we 
obtain that  0 dw / * n d
2 w 2 £ .  
   The interpretation of equation (16) is that when wages slightly decreased, as 
occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century (see Table 2), families needed 
more children to survive, and the fertility rate went up slightly. During the second half 
of the century, wages went up, and therefore workers reduced their fertility rate. The 
interaction between the decisions of workers and the output function leads to a 
relationship between the fertility rate of the workers and the capital-labor ratio as in 
Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. 
In each period, the fertility rate of the workers is a negative function of the capital-
labor ratio as expressed in equation (17):  




t £ D £ D K D =   .  (17) 
Proof. Since the fertility rate is a decreasing function of wages, and wages are an 
increasing function of the capital-labor ratio, we obtain that the fertility rate is a 
decreasing function of the capital-labor ratio. Assuming that 
(




t , we get that  0 ' ' £ D .         ￿ 
  This relationship between the fertility rate and the capital-labor ratio permits to 
analyze the dynamics of the capital-labor ratio.  17 
IV. Equilibrium and the dynamics of capital, wages, and fertility rates 
On the side of the business elite, at the beginning of each period, capital and interest 
rate determine their savings and their fertility rate. For the workers, capital and labor 
given at the beginning of each period determines the wages received by the workers 
and their fertility rate (see equations 2 and 15). In order to examine, over time, the 
behavior of these two fertility rates, one has to analyze the dynamics of the system. 
  The number of children in each family of workers determines the population in 
the next period (since the elite population is negligible), while the savings of the elite 
determines the stock of capital): 
) n 1 ( L L ; S K K
w
t t 1 t t t 1 t + = + = + + .  (18) 
   If the increase in the capital stock is lower than the increase in population, then 
the capital-labor ratio will decline, and wages in the next period will be lower than in 
the first period. As a result, the fertility rate of the workers will increase, and the labor 
supply will increase. When the situation is reversed, there is a decrease in the fertility 
rate. Therefore, the increase or decrease of the capital-labor ratio over time determine 
the dynamics of the economy. From equation (18) we get that:  
w
t t t t t 1 t 1 t n K / S L / K L / K £ ￿ £ + + .  (19) 
i.e., there is an increase in the capital-labor ratio if and only if the savings-capital ratio 
(S/K) is greater than the increase in population, n
w.  
   The two elements of equation (19) can be compared since the savings-capital 
ratio and the fertility rate of the workers are a function of the capital-labor ratio, as 
shown in Figure 3. The relationship between the capital-labor ratio and the fertility 
rate of the workers, i.e., equation (17) is represented by the NN curve, which is 
concave. Substituting the interest rate from equation (2) into equation (10), we get the 
saving-capital ratio shown in equation (20) and represented by the curve SS of which 




t t t ) L / K ( A ) n ( P K / S
- a a = .  (20) 
  The interaction between capital and labor leads to the dynamics of the model as 
summarized in the following Proposition. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
19 However, n
b is also a function of rK, but the effect of k on n
b is negligible. 18 
Proposition 
  (i) After the proto-industrialization and during the first phase of industrialization, 
the capital-labor ratio decreases, wages go down, and the fertility rate of both 
workers and the business elite goes up. However, these fertility rates are independent 
of each other. 
  (ii) During the second phase of industrialization, the capital-labor ratio increases 
and the fertility rate of the workers decreases. This is the period of the demographic 
transition.  
  (iii) The dynamics of the fertility rate of the business elite are independent of the 
fertility rate of the workers. A decrease in this fertility rate can be explained by a 
decrease in the mortality rate in this social class.  
Proof. Figure 3 depicts the NN curve that describes the fertility rate, n
w, and the SS 
curve that describes the S/K function. K/L* is the steady state where capital increases 
at the same rate as population. During the eighteenth century, the dynamics was of an 
increase in capital-labor ratio, fertility rates and population towards the steady state as 
shown by arrow (1). However, a shock that leads to an increase in capital-labor ration 
as were the wars at the end of the eighteenth century leads that the capital-labor ratio, 
n
w is greater than S/K, so that the capital-labor ratio is decreasing (as shown by arrow 
(2)). This situation continues until the system reaches again the steady state at K/L*, 
where n
w is equal to S/K. This is a steady state, a priori, and there are no changes in 
the capital-labor ratio or in wages. At this point, the variable that drives the system to 
continue to move is the fertility rate of the entrepreneurs (n
b), since it is a function of 
capital that is still continuing to increase. The exogenous variable that also drives the 
system is A (technological progress). Since A and n
b increase, the SS curve shifts 
continuously to the right. So from then on, the trajectory is a movement along the NN 
curve described by equation (17). Over time, the capital-labor ratio increases, and as a 
result, the fertility rate n
w decreases.                              ￿               
  The era of industrialization cannot be described as a long and steady increase in 
real income of all classes. During the whole firs half of the nineteenth century, 
standard of living decrease for the workers and yet fertility rates slightly increase. 
Indeed, during the nineteenth century, there was a negative correlation between wages 19 
(and the capital-labor ratio) and the fertility rate. The fertility rate of the business elite 
increased as a consequence of the increase in capital. During the first phase of 
industrialization, both these fertility rates increase, but for different reasons: that of 
the workers because of a reduction of their wages, and that of the elite because of an 
increase in the value of their firms. It should be emphasized that the increase in 
fertility rates of the proletariat in the first half of the nineteenth century was small, as 
was the decrease in wages. 
  During the second phase, the fertility rate of the workers decreases, and this is the 
period of the demographic transition. The dynamics as presented do not lead to a 
decrease in the elite’s fertility rate. However, when one incorporates the decrease in 
the mortality rate, it leads to a decrease in the fertility rate. In other words, there is no 
causality effect in the behavior of these two fertility rates, as stated by Stevenson 
(1920).      
V. Conclusion 
Altruism has become a concept that is taken for granted in family economics. It is an 
assumption that does not need explaining for those of us living at the turn of the 
twenty first century, and it was certainly true for those living in the developed world 
in the twentieth century. But to take this modeling approach and apply it through all 
of the centuries can be problematic. 
  This paper proposes a framework more specific to the nineteenth century, while it 
tries to paint a more concentrated picture that fits the details of this specific period 
regarding demography, industrialization, and the behavior of the various social 
classes. The model not only offers an explanation for the demographic transition, but 
it also explains the possible correlation between the fertility rates of both the 
proletariat and the business elite.  
  It shows that both fertility rates increase concurrently, yet during the 
demographic transition, these fertility rates are not correlated and are independent. 
Indeed, when income increases (ceteris paribus), it has a positive influence on the 
number of children given birth to by the business elite. However, an income increase 
has the opposite effect on the proletariat: higher wages lead to a reduction in the 
number of children. The dynamics shown by the model corroborate the findings of 
Stevenson (1920, p. 431) that “The difference in fertility between the social classes is 20 
small for marriage contracted before 1861, and rapidly increases to a maximum for 
those of 1891-96”.  
  In conclusion, this model, which departs from the Malthusian view, can be an 
alternative that is better suited for explaining phenomena that occurred in the 
nineteenth century with regard to industrialization and demography. It is based on the 
fact that laws governing population decisions are not unrelated to historical processes, 
and models suitable for the twentieth century cannot always be adapted to the 
nineteenth century, since: “In fact every special historic mode of production has its 
own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits alone”. (Marx, 
1976, p. 784). 
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Earnings and cost of living for one worker couple in Bath for the years  
1832–1850.  
 
   Earnings  Cost of living 
 Bath 
(England) 
            (shillings per week)    
1832  9s 6d  13s 1d 
1840  13s 2d  13s 10d 
1850  14s 1d  14s 2d 
     
 
Sources: Neale, 1975. 
Notes: For Bath it is assumed that subsistence for one worker couple includes 28.5lb of bread, 1.5 lb of 
meat, 1lb of bacon, 3lb of cheese, and 4lb of potatoes. The cost of this basket for 1832 was 9s6d. We 
add to it 1s4d for clothing and shoes, 3d for candles and soap, 6d for fuel, and 1s6d for rent, for a total 





Fertility rate, wages, and the ratio of capital to labor in England during the 
nineteenth century 
 
  (1) 
Index of Fertility 
rate 
(2)                               (3)                           
Real Wages 
(4) 
K/L in the 
industrial sector 
    average  in the cotton industry   
1800  65  84.9  98  396 
1810  65  105.4  81  383 
1820  65  110.9  67  375 
1830  65  114.3  64  335 
1840  66  115.9  66  340 
1850  67  138.6  84  346 
1860  67  135.1  90  378 
1870  68  151.3  109  400 
1880  65  173.8  122  420 
1890  62  234.2  157  434 
 
Sources: column (1): the index of legitimate fertility rate (Ig), Bardet and Dupaquier, 1998; column (2): 
Feinstein, 1998, p. 653; column (3): nominal wages, Mitchell and Deane, 1971, p.349 divided by cost 
of living index, Feinstein, 1998, p.653; column (4): for capital: Feinstein 1981; and for labor: 
Maddison, 1995. 27 
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RHS 
-l’/l 
n*  Fertility of the elite 28 
 
Figure 2 
































   
   
   
n* 
fertility of workers 
   
      
   
   
C   
 
U(C(n), n) 













   
   
2 
    K/L*  K/L 
   
      
   
   
   
SS 
NN
  St/Kt ,n
w
t 
1 Bar-Ilan University 
Department of Economics 
WORKING PAPERS  
 
1-01   The Optimal Size for a Minority 
Hillel Rapoport and Avi Weiss, January 2001. 
2-01   An Application of a Switching Regimes Regression to the Study  
of Urban Structure 
Gershon Alperovich and Joseph Deutsch, January 2001. 
3-01   The Kuznets Curve and the Impact of Various Income Sources on the 
Link Between Inequality and Development     
Joseph Deutsch and Jacques Silber, February 2001. 
4-01  International Asset Allocation: A New Perspective 
Abraham Lioui and Patrice Poncet, February 2001. 
 5-01 תידרחה הליהקהו ןודעומה לדומ    
  גרבנזור בקעי  ,  ראורבפ 2001 .   
6-01  Multi-Generation Model of Immigrant Earnings: Theory and Application 
Gil S. Epstein and Tikva Lecker, February 2001. 
7-01  Shattered Rails, Ruined Credit: Financial Fragility and Railroad 
Operations in the Great Depression 
Daniel A.Schiffman, February 2001. 
8-01  Cooperation and Competition in a Duopoly R&D Market 
Damiano Bruno Silipo and Avi Weiss, March 2001. 
9-01  A Theory of Immigration Amnesties 
Gil S. Epstein and Avi Weiss, April 2001. 
10-01  Dynamic Asset Pricing With Non-Redundant Forwards 
Abraham Lioui and Patrice Poncet, May 2001. 
Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/working_papers.html  
11-01  Macroeconomic and Labor Market Impact of Russian Immigration in 
Israel 
Sarit Cohen and Chang-Tai Hsieh, May 2001. 
12-01  Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium 
Igal Milchtaich, June 2001. 
13-01  General Equilibrium Pricing of Trading Strategy Risk 
Abraham Lioui and Patrice Poncet, July 2001. 
14-01  Social Conformity and Child Labor 
Shirit Katav-Herz, July 2001. 
15-01  Determinants of Railroad Capital Structure, 1830￿1885 
Daniel A. Schiffman, July 2001. 
16-01  Political-Legal Institutions and the Railroad Financing Mix, 1885￿1929 
Daniel A. Schiffman, September 2001. 
17-01  Macroeconomic Instability, Migration, and the Option Value  
of Education 
Eliakim Katz and Hillel Rapoport, October 2001. 
18-01  Property Rights, Theft, and Efficiency: The Biblical Waiver of Fines in 
the Case of Confessed Theft 
Eliakim Katz and Jacob Rosenberg, November 2001. 
19-01  Ethnic Discrimination and the Migration of Skilled Labor 
FrØdØric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport, December 2001. 
1-02  Can Vocational Education Improve the Wages of Minorities and 
Disadvantaged Groups? The Case of Israel 
Shoshana Neuman and Adrian Ziderman, February 2002. 
2-02  What Can the Price Gap between Branded and Private Label Products 
Tell Us about Markups? 
Robert Barsky, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Daniel Levy, March 2002. 
3-02  Holiday Price Rigidity and Cost of Price Adjustment 
Daniel Levy, Georg M￿ller, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark Bergen, March 2002. 
4-02  Computation of Completely Mixed Equilibrium Payoffs 
Igal Milchtaich, March 2002.  
5-02  Coordination and Critical Mass in a Network Market ￿ 
An Experimental Evaluation 
Amir Etziony and Avi Weiss, March 2002. 
6-02  Inviting Competition to Achieve Critical Mass  
Amir Etziony and Avi Weiss, April 2002. 
7-02  Credibility, Pre-Production and Inviting Competition in 
a Network Market 
Amir Etziony and Avi Weiss, April 2002. 
8-02  Brain Drain and LDCs￿ Growth: Winners and Losers 
Michel Beine, FrØderic Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport, April 2002. 
9-02  Heterogeneity in Price Rigidity: Evidence from a Case Study Using 
Micro-Level Data 
Daniel Levy, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark Bergen, April 2002. 
10-02  Price Flexibility in Channels of Distribution: Evidence from Scanner Data 
Shantanu Dutta, Mark Bergen, and Daniel Levy, April 2002. 
11-02  Acquired Cooperation in Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games 
Igal Milchtaich and Avi Weiss, April 2002. 
12-02  Cointegration in Frequency Domain  
Daniel Levy, May 2002. 
13-02  Which Voting Rules Elicit Informative Voting? 
Ruth Ben-Yashar and Igal Milchtaich, May 2002. 
14-02  Fertility, Non-Altruism and Economic Growth: 
Industrialization in the Nineteenth Century 
Elise S. Brezis, October 2002.  